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NEIGHBORHOOD PRODUCTION
STRUCTURES, WITH AN APPLICATION
TO THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE*
By RONALD W. JONES and HENRYK KIERZKOWSKI
IT is a common observation that unless some structure is imposed, general
equilibrium models of production with many factors and commodities yield
few unambiguous comparative statics results. One example where structure
allows such results is the higher-dimensional version of the specific-factors
model, with the stark contrast between n factors each tied to a separate
production process and a single factor mobile among all activities supporting
clear factor-price responses to changes in commodity prices. In the present
paper we analyze a different kind of higher-dimensional structure, one in
which no factor is specific to any single activity, but nonetheless occupa-
tional choices are severely limited. The structure is inspired by a model in
which geographic proximity is crucial: each productive process uses as
inputs only those factors located in its immediate "neighborhood".
The paper first develops some general properties of the n-factor,
n-commodity model with neighborhood productive structures, with particu-
lar attention paid to the effects on factoral income distribution of changes in
commodity prices. Two branches of the general model are distinguished—
the "cooperative" model, in which a single price rise in any sector jointly
benefits the neighboring productive factors used as inputs to that sector, and
the "non-cooperative" model, in which one factor gains and the other loses
in the favored sector. The "non-cooperative" model is the one analyzed in
this paper. A multilateral concept of factor intensity emerges as the crucial
determinant of the winning factor in the favored sector. Further com-
parisons of factor intensity are developed viz., rankings within the two parts
of the economy created when neighboring sectors share in a common price
rise, the "favored" part comprising these neighboring sectors and the
"fixed-price" part consisting of the rest of the economy.
Although the general model can be applied in several ways to various
problems that are discussed in the theory of international trade, we choose
to focus on one such problem that heretofore has received little attention.
In a two-country model of the world economy suppose that trade is allowed
not only in final commodities but also in two (both) types of sector-specific
capital. This can be viewed as a particular example for a neighborhood
production structure of the "non-cooperative" type with n = 4. If world
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taste patterns change in favor of the type of commodity produced in each
country using a particular type of internationally mobile capital, should we
expect the return to that capital unambiguously to rise, the return to the
other kind of capital to fall, with less severe adjustments required in each
country's wage rate? As we demonstrate, such a result is by no means
assured. Furthermore, much depends upon intra-industry factor intensity
comparisons between countries rather than traditional inter-industry
rankings between commodities within either country. Indeed, the neighbor-
hood production structure reveals how such a taste change might unam-
biguously favor real wages at the expense of both types of capital even when
the commodity that has gone up in price in each country is capital-intensive.
The final section of the paper offers some concluding remarks about the
relationship between the model exhibiting the neighborhood production
structure and the sector-specific model.
I. Neighborhood production structures: general properties
In the n -sector version of the model there exist n distinct productive
activities, each only employing two different factors of production. Sym-
metry is further reflected in the requirement that every productive factor
has two alternative employment outlets. The schematic illustration in Fig. 1
shows each producing sector, Xj, geographically located on a circle, with
each sector making use of the two neighboring factors shown by the arcs
connecting the x/s. Thus x2 employs factors V2 and V3 while factor Vx has
two sectors in which it finds work: xn and xv No productive factor is
completely specific, but mobility is restricted for each factor to the two
neighboring productive sectors. Whereas in the general nXn model of
production each factor is potentially employable in all n sectors, in the
FIG. 1
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neighborhood production structure this mobility is limited to the two nearby
sectors for each and every factor. Thus the neighborhood structure adopts
the idea that each factor may not be required in all activities and pushes this
idea to the limit that still allows some element of choice for all factors and all
commodities.
Suppose the price of commodity ;' rises. In a competitive market the
return to at least one of the factors employed in xf must rise, and perhaps
both do. The model featuring a neighborhood production structure allows
each of these outcomes. The "cooperative" result, wherein a price rise
rebounds to the benefit of both factors employed in the favoured industry, is
a feature of models in which the number of producing sectors, n, is odd,
whereas "non-cooperative" outcomes characterize models in which n is
even. (The 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model is the simplest case—the Stolper-
Samuelson feature of a price rise leading to a real gain for one factor and
loss for the other is standard for that case.) These results follow immedi-
ately from a phenomenon characteristic of both models of this type: the
ripple effect for the factor returns in that part of the economy in which
commodity prices have not changed.
Let the industry favored by the price rise be the last one, sector n. If the
return to the first factor, wv rises, the return to other factor employed in the
constant-price first sector, w^ must fall, leading to a balancing rise in w3
since p2 is assumed constant, and a fall in vv4, etc. In any competitive model
in which some commodity prices are constant, those factors employed in the
constant-price sectors which experience an increase in returns must, by
the competitive profit conditions, force other factor returns to fall. In the
neighborhood production structure these balancing forces result in ripples of
factor-price increases and decreases for alternatively sequenced factors.
Thus, in the case in which only pn rises, if w1 rises and n is odd, so does wn.
Factors Vi and Vn, the pair used in the favored nth sector, share
cooperatively in the rise in pn. But, should n be an even number, an
increase in w1 sends ripples throughout the rest of the economy consistent
only with a fall in wn. The increase in pn cannot be shared cooperatively by
the two factors employed in producing xn. Of course this argument only
states that vvx and wM the returns to the two factors employed by
favored-sector n, must move in opposite directions. Which of the two
factors gains depends upon factor intensities.
A principal result to be established now is that if the number of
productive sectors, n, is even, an increase in pj (alone) will serve to increase
the return to factor j , (and reduce the return to factor j + 1, the other factor
employed in the yth sector) if and only if commodity j is relatively intensive
in its use of factor /. But a multilateral concept of factor intensity is
required, one that contains information on all sectors of the economy. To
proceed formally, let w represent the vector of relative changes in factor
prices, p the vector of relative changes in commodity prices, and 0,y the
distributive share of the earnings of factor j in sector^'. By the competitive
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The determinant of coefficients, \6\, is shown in (2):
10| = I I 0;> ~ El 0;+i j where / + 1 = 1 for / = n.
i i
Suppose only pn rises. Then the solution for wn is shown in (3):
1 ^
w» = 7-TT 0,, • o_
(2)
(3)
Therefore the sign of the determinant, \d\, dictates the fate of factor n when
the price of commodity n rises when n is even.1
The multilateral concept of factor intensity appropriate for models with
neighborhood productive structures is that sector j uses factor ; intensively
in a multilateral sense if and only if |f?| is positive. (Note what this entails: If
sector j employs factory intensively in this multilateral sense, then sector j
employs factor i intensively, for all j . No two sectors can have a multilateral
intensity in the same factor.) Consider the nth sector, which uses factors Vn
and Vv Vn is also used to produce xn_1 and Vx to produce xv The economy
can be considered to be aggregated into two parts: favored-sector n and the
rest of the economy, and the latter also employs Vn and Vx (and all other Vj




so that the inequality in (4) can be rewritten as in
"nn, un,n-l "n-l,n-2 "21 ,J,\
a\n an-\,n-\ an-2,n-2 flll
Both sides of this inequality have dimensionality factor n per unit of factor 1
and thus involve a comparison of sector n's use of Vn and Vt relative to the
rest of the economy's use of these two factors. The logic and interpretation
of this argument are analogous to the problem of assigning commodities to
1
 If n is odd, the expression for |0| becomes (TJ 0u + FI fy+i.y) which must be positive. In this
paper we restrict our attention to "non-cooperative" models in which n is even.
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countries according to a multilateral criterion for comparative advantage in
a Ricardo-Graham model of trade.2
To pursue the idea of separating the economy into two parts (favored
sector n where price has risen and sectors 1 through n — 1 where prices are
constant), consider the competitive profit conditions of change in the
constant-price sectors. These are shown by the first n — 1 equations in (1).
The first of these can be solved for wx in terms of vv2:
The second can, in similar fashion, be solved for w2 in terms of w3 and,
continuing this way, the (n - l)st equation shows that:
Successive substitutions allow us to solve for wx in terms of wn:
Now rewrite this expression together with that for sector n (which has risen
in price) as equation set (5):
1 1 "J + l.JI"" "
 (r\
This aggregation of sectors 1 through (n — 1) allows us to represent it as a
part of the economy using factors Vx and Vn just as does section n. In
non-cooperative models in which n is even, the typical two-by-two result is
obtained wherein an increase inpn raises, by a magnified amount, the return
to the factor used intensively in that sector and lowers the return to the
other factor. The concept of factor intensity relevant here, of course, is the
sign of |6>j in (2), which is the determinant of coefficient in (5).
II. Neighboring price rises in non-cooperative models
For some purposes it is useful to investigate the impact on the factoral
distribution of income when two neighboring sectors both share in a rise in
price (of the same relative magnitude) while prices remain constant in the
rest of the economy. For example, let sectors n and 1 share a common price
rise: pn=Pi=P- Factors in the economy can then be grouped into three
categories: (a) A single factor, Vx, is "specific" to the two sectors which
have experienced a price rise; (b) Two "edge" factors, Vn and V^ are used
both in that part of the economy favored by the price rise (xn and x{) and in
^See the discussion in Jones (1961).
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the rest of the economy; and (c) The remaining factors V3,..., Vn_v are used
exclusively in sectors which have not experienced a price rise. For these
factors, the ripple effect described earlier can be expected to hold: if w2
rises, w3 will fall, w4 will rise, and so on, with wn_x falling (since n is an even
number by assumption).
With the qualitative similarity in the experience of the two "edge" factors
established, it becomes tempting to ask the circumstances under which
factor price responses to neighboring price rises in non-cooperative models
resemble those of the specific-factor, (n + 1) x n model. In particular, with
pn and px rising, can (a) the return to factor 1, that factor used exclusively
(or "specifically") in the favored sectors of the economy, rise relatively
more than pn and pv (b) the return to "edge" factors n and 2 behave like
"mobile" factors (these are used partly in the favored sectors and partly in
the rest of the economy) and rise, but by less than pn and pv with (c) some
aggregate measure of the returns to all other factors falling? (These other
factors are "specific" to that part of the economy not experiencing a price
rise; of course the ripple effect precludes all these factor prices from falling).
Equation set (1) can be solved explicitly for the factor price changes
associated with a rise in the price of neighboring sectors 1 and n. But before
proceeding in this formal fashion consider the potential role of factor
intensities. The multilateral ranking for all n sectors taken together required
a comparison between II Ojj and II 0,+i,/- The former was assumed to be
larger (|0| > 0 in equation (2)). Neighboring price rises for sectors 1 and n
serve to split the economy into two parts: the "favored" part (sectors 1 and
n), and the "fixed price" part (sections ; =f 1, n). Suppose a similar
comparison of the product of distributive shares were to be made within
each such part of the economy. That is, suppose II 6U were compared
j = \,n
with II 8,+i; for the favored part of the economy, while II 6U were
compared with Ft fy+iy for the fixed-price part. As we now show, such
separate comparisons prove crucial in determining the effect of these
neighboring commodity price changes on factor prices.
Consider, first, the significance of the intensity ranking within the favored
part of the economy consisting of sectors 1 and n. A comparison of II 0;;
7 = 1 , 1
with Ft <?.+i boils down to a comparison of the intensity with which factor
7 = 1, n
1 is used in sectors 1 and n (0n compared with dln). What is the same thing,
this involves a comparison of the intensity with which "edge" factor n
is used in that sector of the favored part of the economy in which it is
employed (9nn), with the intensity with which the other "edge" factor, 2,
is used in that sector of the favored part of the economy in which it is
employed (02i)- With pl and pn both set equal to a common (positive) p,
equations (6) display the competitive profit conditions of change in the two
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favored sectors:
dnwi + d2lw2=p
Without further knowledge of the structure of the rest of the economy it is
impossible to tell from the conditions in the favored part of the economy
alone whether vvj exceeds p (with "edge" w2 and wn falling short of p) or
whether positions are reversed so that both w2 and wn exceed p (with wx less
than p). Nonetheless, the factor-intensity ranking within the favored part of
the economy does indicate which of w2 and wn lies closer to p. Thus if 0nn
exceeds 62V wn must lie closer to p than does w2 because wx has a smaller
share in sector n than it does in sector 1. As a consequence, the com-
parison of II djj with n Qj+\,j in the favored part of the economy
j = \,n 7 = 1,n
indicates which of the "edge" factors lies closer to the price change common
to all (both) sectors in the favored part. In particular, the assumption that
II Ojj exceeds n fy+i./ implies either that w2>wn>p>w1 or that
j~\,n 7 = 1,n
ti>1>p>wn>w2.
Somewhat the same procedure can be followed in the fixed-price part of
the economy, with one exception. With n large, more than two sectors
comprise this subset of the economy, so that a multilateral ranking is
required, involving a comparison between II Qu over all industries in the
fixed-price part (/=f 1, n), on the one hand, and II 0,+i;> o n the other. To
+1see this, follow the procedure used in obtaining equation (5), which
revealed the ripple effect connecting the returns to the two edge factors.
Substitution through the competitive profit conditions for sectors 2 through
n — 1 reveals that
n 0 y + w+
w2(iy wn. (?)
In non-cooperative models with an even number of sectors (or, more
particularly, an even number of sectors in the fixed-price part of the
economy), edge returns rise or fall together. What is crucial is which change
in factor return lies closer to zero (the value of the commodity price change
in the fixed-price part of the economy). By analogy with our remarks about
the favored part of the economy we would like to define edge factor 2 as
used intensively in a multilateral sense in the fixed-price part of the
economy (which includes sector 2) as compared with edge factor n (where
sector n is not included in the fixed-price part of the economy) if n 6n
i+hn
exceeds II 0j+l . As (7) reveals, if in this sense the fixed-price part of the
economy uses factor 2 intensively, w2 lies closer to the commodity price
change (zero) than does wn.
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Three factor intensity rankings have been considered: (i) The overall
multilateral ranking in which we assume factors are numbered so that FI 0;y
exceeds II 0 y + u and thus factory is used intensively in industry j ; (ii) The
bilateral comparison in the part of the economy consisting of neighboring
sectors 1 and n when they are the only sectors favored by a (similar) price
rise; and (iii) The multilateral criterion in the fixed-price part of the
economy, involving a comparison of reduced products II 0<j and
fl 0,+i j- We now define these latter two rankings as "consistent" with the
assumption that overall II6•• exceeds II 0,+i if, for the favored part, II Ojj
j=l,n
exceeds II 9)+lJ and, for the fixed-price part, FI 9U exceeds FI 9j+1J.
j = l,a ' i+\,n j+l,n
More generally, the multilateral intensity ranking uniquely associates each
factor with one of its neighboring sectors. When the economy is subdivided
into two parts "consistency" follows if each edge factor is intensive in the
subdivision containing the sector with which it has the multilateral
association.
That these intensity comparisons matter is reflected in the formal solutions
(from (1)) for the change in the returns to edge-factors 2 and n when
f n »,•f % n
hiJsw^ u e" (9)
P lyl j+l.n
As well, we can exhibit the change in the real return to the first factor,
which is used only in the favored part of the economy:
From these expressions it is clear that if intensity rankings in both
subdivisions of the economy are consistent with the overall ranking, the
factor price response to a neighboring commodity price rise in sectors 1 and




 In the last term, 0' refers to the share of factor i in the national income. That this weighted
sum for changes in prices of factors used exclusively in the fixed-price part of the economy must
be negative can be simply proved by considering the competitive profit conditions of change in
sectors 2 through n — 1 (see equation (1)). Multiply each by the industry share of
output / in the national income, djt and add to obtain: {02022l*;2+ 8n_,flnn_1ivn} +
| S fl'iVj^O. Since with consistent rankings Wz and wn are positive, the last inequality in
(11) must follow.
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The logic behind this ranking can be revealed by noting that the only way
wn can lie closer than w2 to p, (which it must do if n is used bilaterally more
intensively in the favored part than is 2) and, simultaneously, w2 lie closer
than wn to zero (which it must do if 2 is used more intensively in a
multilateral sense in the fixed-price part than is n) is for both to lie trapped
between the two commodity price changes. The other factor price changes
follow accordingly, since each commodity price change is flanked by factor
price changes.
"Consistency" in the three factor-intensity rankings is not a required
feature of the neighborhood production structure. To see what violation of
consistency entails, we turn now to a particular application of the
non-cooperative neighborhood model for n = 4.
III. International factor mobility and the case of n = 4.
The specific-factors model has been used extensively in the theory of
international trade, especially in a small country setting in which commodity
prices in two sectors are determined in the rest of the world, the nation's
labor force is mobile between the two sectors, and two types of capital are
specific in their use. Figure 2 provides a schematic illustration of a
two-country world in which products from two industries are freely traded.
Commodities X and X* are not identical, but they belong to the same
^-industry, characterized in particular by the use in production of the same
type of capital. Similarly, although the home country's Y-product may be
differentiated by consumers from the foreign country's Y*, these two
products are each produced by combining labor with a specific Y-type of
Foreign Home
FIG. 2








capital. If, as in Fig. 2, no factor is internationally mobile, a shift in world
taste patterns away from products of the world's Y-industry towards A'-type
products has a readily-identified impact on factor prices: in each country the
return to type-A' captial unambiguously rises, that of type-Y capital falls,
while wage rates in each country rise relatively less than the price of X but
improve in terms of Y.
The possible international mobility of capital alters this scenario. Of
particular interest here is the case in which both types of sector-specific
capital are internationally mobile.4 The schematic representation in Fig. 3
suggests that a trading world in which national labor forces are mobile
within countries but immobile between, whereas capital is specific in its
occupational use but footloose in world markets, provides a special example
of a neighborhood production structure for n = 4. Among the four
producing sectors two types of commodities are distinguished: a world
A'-sector comprises products X and X* while each country produces as well
a product in the world Y-industry. World demands are such as to support an
4Some analyses, e.g., Brecher and Findlay (1983) and Jones and Dei (1983), consider the
case in which one type of capital is internationally mobile. The effect in such a model of a rise
in the world's relative price of commodity X is similar to that just described when there is no
international factor mobility. Both types of capital are internationally mobile in Caves (1971)
and Jones, Neary, and Ruane (1983), models concerned with the phenomenon of cross-hauling
of capital. In the latter paper one of the commodities is treated as non-tradeable so as to avoid
the possible necessity of specialization in one traded good for a small country which accepts
commodity prices and the rate of return to internationally-mobile capital as given from the rest
of the world. In our present treatment this is not necessary since rates of return are
endogeneously determined and consumer tastes allow product differentiation within each
industry, although both countries use the same industry-specific capital input.
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initial equilibrium in which all four products are produced.5 As before,
suppose tastes shift towards products of the world's AMndustry. In
particular, consider an equiproportionate rise in world prices px and p*
(equal to px), at the expense of constant prices throughout the world's
Y-industry.
The simplification which the reduction of n to 4 introduces into our earlier
analysis is that the "favored" and "fixed-price" parts of the economy each
symmetrically comprise only two sectors. When the world prices of
commodities X and X* rise, the "favored" part of the world economy
consists of sector X at home and sector X* abroad. The factor "specific" to
this part is K%, the world's supply of capital used only in the world's
Ar-industry. The two "edge" factors are the labor forces in each country, L
and L*. In the fixed-price part of the world economy, consisting of sectors Y
at home and Y* abroad, the "specific" factor is Y-type capital, K™. In the
general case with many sectors (/' = 2, . . . , n - 1) comprising the fixed-price
part of the economy, a multilateral factor intensity ranking between edge
factors involves the comparison of II Q,, with IT 0j+1 n (see equation (7)).
i+\,n j+\,n
In our present case this reduces to a comparison between dLY6^Y and
dlYdKY, a bilateral comparison of capital and labor shares in home and
foreign Y-industries.6 Similarly, in the favored A'-part of the world
economy, the crucial bilateral intensity comparison is intra-industry (and
inter-national), that between 6KX and d*KX.1
Our preceding remarks concerning Fig. 2's illustration of trade between
two 3 x 2 economies with internationally immobile capitals have suggested
that when world price rises in the Ar-industry, it might be reasonable to
suppose that the return to type-A' capital rises by more than the price of X,
the return to type-Y capital falls, while both national wage rate changes lie
trapped between the two price changes. Indeed, our general discussion of
5
 The world transformation surface in the space of the four commodities is strictly bowed out
if, as we assume, techniques required to produce goods are different (|0| different from zero).
Therefore there is some set of relative commodity prices that will support positive production
of all four commodities. If this set includes values for which px = pf and py = p*, consumers
might view products X and A"* in the two countries as identical (and similarly for Y and Y*). We
adopt a more general stance: X and X* can be members of the same industry, "both requiring
the same K%, but differentiated in the eyes of the world's consumers, so that indifference
surfaces may be strictly bowed in. Our assumption in any case is that initial equilibrium is at a
price vector supporting positive production of all four commodities.
6
 In the present case translation requires factor 1 to be type-A" capital, factor 2 to be home
labor, and factor n to be foreign labor. Similarly, commodity 1 is the home A'-sector and
commodity n the foreign A"*-sector. Compare Figs. 1 and 3.
7
 Comparing value shares for the same industry between countries (say dKX and 6%x) is not
the same as comparing physical capital/labor ratios, since wage rates are presumably different.
For example, if the home country has a lower level of techniques, expressing itself in a lower
wage rate, the home country may have its A'-sector capital-intensive compared with A"* (in the
sense of 6^ greater than Ofcx) but nonetheless employ a lower capital/labor ratio. Unless
otherwise indicated, we always refer to factor intensities in the value sense imparted by
distributive shares.
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neighboring price rises in a model with even n has provided the conditions
sufficient to guarantee this result in the present case in which both types of
capital are internationally mobile: the intensity rankings in each part of the
world economy be consistent with the overall multilateral factor intensity
ranking.
In the general case we arbitrarily assumed that in a multilateral sense
each industry used intensively that factor with the same number, so that
IT 6jj exceeds II dj+hj. The comparison of Figs. 1 and 3 shows that such an
assumption in our present interpretation with n = 4 implies that8
QKX8LY6*KYQ1X> ^LX^KY^LY^KX- (12)
This implies that in the neighborhood production structure there must exist
the factor-intensity reversal phenomenon for multilateral rankings. If the
home .Y-sector is (multilaterally) capital intensive, the foreign A'*-sector is
(multilaterally) labor intensive. Both X and X* share a common pool of
capital, and they cannot both be intensive (multilaterally) in its use.
Similarly, equation (12) states that the Y-sector at home is (multilaterally)
labor intensive, but abroad Y* is capital intensive.
"Consistency" for the experiment in which the prices of both A'-sectors
alone rise in unison requires that if (12) reflects the multilateral ranking, it
is also the case that
8KXOLX>0LX0KX and 6>LY6*KY> 6KYd*LY (13)
or, more briefly, that dKX exceeds 8^ and 6*KY exceeds 9KY. Indeed, one
could start with the separate bilateral rankings: consistency requires that
neither country have both its sectors more capital-intensive than the other
country in a bilateral sense. If the X-industry at home is (in a bilateral value
sense) more capital intensive than its counterpart abroad and the Y-industry
at home less capital intensive than is Y* abroad, as portrayed in (13), the
ranking shown in (11) for the general case of such consistency reduces to
(14):
rx>px>w*>w>0(=py)>fy (14)
This is the ranking associated with the specific-factors model with the extra
detail provided by the ordering of national wage rate changes, both trapped
within the bounds set by commodity-price changes. Ranking (14) shows that
w* lies closer to px than does w, reflecting X*'s intra-industry labor-intensity
ranking vis-a-vis X in (13), while w lies closer to py (equal to zero) reflecting
Y's intra-industry labor-intensity vis-a-vis Y* in (13).
8This comparison is equivalent to one among physical capital/labor ratios: kxlky > k*/k*.
But with reference to the preceding footnote, the ranking kx>k* need not imply that
QKXIOLX exceeds O^xldtx s ' n c e w differ between countries. Similarly, a comparison of kx
with ky within a single country need not correspond to the share comparison since each sector
uses a different kind of capital. Recall that in the neighborhood production structure two
sectors jointly employ at most a single factor.
R. W. JONES AND H. KIERZKOWSKI 71
Although this ranking has intuitive appeal in connection with the
specific-factors model, it is not a necessary outcome, and will be violated if
one country's capital share exceeds the other's sector by sector. To pursue
the analysis, note that both wage rate changes either lie trapped between
the price changes or they both lie outside, since within each disaggregated
part of the world economy the changes in both wage rates must lie on
opposite sides of the commodity price change than does the change in the
common return to that type of internationally-mobile capital. Therefore it is
useful to concentrate on the behaviour of wage rates, where national labor
forces are the "edge" factors in this case.
The procedure we now follow is familiar from our general treatment.
Favored world Ar-production consists of home and foreign production, and
the pair of competitive profit conditions in these sectors provides a
relationship between "edge" returns w and w*:9
WKXQIXW - (oLXd*KX)w = (e^ - e^Pr (15)
Similarly, in the fixed-price Y-part of the world economy,10
-{eKYdtY)w* + {eLYe*KY)w = o (16)
Figure 4, showing these relationships between wage changes, is drawn under
the assumptions both that the multilateral ranking in (12) holds (whereby X
is multilaterally capital intensive and X* labor intensive), as well as the
consistent pair of bilaterial rankings provided by (13). If there were to be no
price change in the A'-sectors of the world economy, the returns to national
wage rates would be restricted to the XX* locus. That is, any increase in
home w would drive down the world's return to type-A' capital, and thus
raise foreign w*. That this line is flatter than the 45° line reflects the
assumption that in a bilateral intra-AMndustry comparison X* is labor
intensive, requiring w* to lie closer to the price change (zero along XX*)
than does w. Similarly the YY* locus, drawn for a constant price of Y,
shows w and w* moving up or down together. Since we are assuming Y to
be bilaterally labor-intensive compared to Y*, this line must be steeper than
the 45° line so that w lies closer to Y's price change (zero) than does w*.
The relationship of each locus to the 45° line thus reflects the bilateral
rankings in (13), while the fact that YY* is drawn steeper than XX* is
reflective of the multilateral ranking in (12).
An increase in the world price of X shifts the XX* locus upwards to
(XX*)'; equation (15) confirms this result if the home country's A'-sector is
bilaterally capital-intensive relative to that abroad, as assumed. (This
intensity condition thus serves double duty: it implies that XX* is flatter
than the 45° line and that an increase in px shifts the locus upwards). The
amount of the shift, (6,^ - O^p, is smaller than the price rise. The latter,
9
 The general competitive profit conditions of change in each favored sector are shown in (6).
10
 This corresponds to equation (7) in the general case.






p, is shown by the vertical distance to point B where (XX*)' intersects the
45° line; if w and w* are equal at a point (B) along (XX*)', they must each
equal p. The position of point A, where the X' and Y loci intersect,
confirms the specific-factors type of result shown in ranking (14) whereby
both wage rates rise, but not by as much as the world price of X, as well as
the intra-industry intensity comparisons whereby w* exceeds w.
Suppose, now, that the multilateral ranking shown by (12) remains valid,
but that the difference between the intensities with which the home and
foreign Y-sectors use labor and capital starts to diminish. The YY* locus in
Fig. 4 would be shown rotated clockwise (around the origin) from its
original position, so that as px rises the equilibrium changes in wage rates
move from A to C. Factor intensity rankings are still "consistent",
supporting again the rankings of returns shown in (14), but both w and w*
move closer to the price change in the Ar-sector, p. Should home and
foreign factor intensity differences in the Y-industry completely vanish
(leading to a YY* schedule co-existent with the 45° line and an intersection
with (XX*)' at B), both wage rates rise by the same relative amount as does
the world price of commodity X. Identical value intensities within the
world's Y-industry require that any wage change in one country be matched
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exactly by a comparable change abroad. With intra-industry factor inten-
sities still assumed to differ in the X-part of the world economy, wage rate
changes cannot be equal unless they both equal the change in the rate of
return to X-type capital (and thus to the change in the price of X).
This type of argument can now easily be extended to show how
"inconsistent" intensity rankings must cause national labor forces to become
"extreme" in the older Heckscher-Ohlin sense of reflecting an unam-
biguous improvement (or worsening) of real wages as a consequence of a
price change. Suppose the home country's Y-sector now becomes more
capital-intensive than Y* abroad, but with the difference less pronounced
than in the world's .X-industry. That is, in Fig. 4 the YY* locus is now flatter
than the 45° line (but still steeper than the XX* locus). Intersection is at a
point such as D. The increase in the world price of X has raised both
countries' wage rates by a more than proportional amount. With each
foreign sector bilaterally more labor-intensive than its home counterpart,
w* must lie closer both to zero and to p then does w, and thus must now fall
short of w. The return to the world's type of capital used exclusively in the
favored X-part of the world economy cannot rise by as much as the price of
X. Indeed, the return to X-type capital may actually fall.
The major results for this interpretation of the neighborhood model for
n = 4 can now be brought together. When the prices of X-typt goods rise
throughout the world, the effect on returns to internationally-mobile but
sector-specific capital and occupationally-mobile but country-specific labor
depends crucially on the "consistency" of the bilateral intra-industry
intensity rankings. The neighborhood production structure requires a
multilateral factor-intensity reversal between countries: on a multilateral
basis if X is capital intensive, X* must be labor intensive (and Y must be
labor intensive and Y* capital intensive). We have defined "consistency" as
the situation n in which each intra-industry ranking conforms with the
multilateral ranking, implying that each country possesses a sector which is
bilaterally capital intensive relative to its counterpart in the other country.
In such a case a rise in the world price of type-X products leads to results
familiar from specific-factor models: Jf-type capital unambiguously gains
and Y-type capital loses, while each country's wage rate is trapped between
the price changes. However, one country's wage will rise by more than the
other, and the winner in this international wage comparison is the country
in which the favored A'-industry is labor intensive.
Lack of "consistency" in the neighborhood model is possible. It is
associated with a situation in which one country has an intra-industry
dominance in capital's distributive share in both sectors. In such a case
relative price changes lead to unambiguous gains or losses to both countries'
labor forces, a situation reminiscent of 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin models. The
key question centers on a comparison of the ratio of capital/labor shares in
one industry and the other. If the favored industry has the larger
intra-industry intensity spread (so that its bilateral ranking corresponds to
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the multilateral factor intensity ranking), real wages in both countries
unambiguously rise.11 This rise is especially pronounced in the country
which uses labor relatively unintensively in the favored sector.12
To stress the point that factor returns in this model are guided by world
intra-industry intensity comparisons instead of the more typical intra-
country comparisons of intensities between commodities in different in-
dustries, note that in the example shown in Fig. 4 in which the YY*
schedule goes from the origin through point D it is possible for the X-sector
to exhibit a higher capital intensity than the F-sector in each country. For
example, suppose
a a a* a*
UKX^_ °KY^ °KX ^ °KY
a a a* a* '
ULX °LY °LX °LY
with, nonetheless, criterion (12) satisfied. Then despite the relative labor-
intensity in each country of the industry (Y) which has suffered a relative
decline in price, real wages in both countries unambiguously rise. The two
crucial strands in the argument are: (i) the same country has a higher
intra-industry capital share in each sector—this leads to unambiguous real
wage changes, and (ii) the industry favored by the price rise exhibits a wider
spread in techniques between countries than does the other industry—this
requires wages more closely to approximate the price that has risen.
Nowhere in the argument is appeal made to intra-country comparisons of
techniques.
IV. Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that the two most heavily used simple general
equilibrium models of production in international trade theory and other
fields are the 2 x 2 model associated with the names of Heckscher, Ohlin,
and Samuelson and the 3 x 2 specific-factors model. The former stresses the
asymmetry in the proportions in which factors of production are utilized,
while the latter focuses upon a different asymmetry—that between the
degree of intersectoral mobility possessed by each factor. It has been a
relatively easy task to free the specific-factors model from its dependence
upon a small number of commodities; the (n + 1) x n version of the model
preserves most of the properties characteristic of the 3 x 2 model.13 But the
2 x 2 model has not been generalized that easily. Some structure must be
11
 As the analysis in Fig. 4 suggests, as the spread in the world y-industry becomes smaller,
for given spread in the world A"-industry, wage rate changes must more closely resemble the
change in the price of X (the favored sector).
12
 Indeed the same country will (in this incosistent case) use labor less intensively
sector-by-sector. In our example (point Q in Fig. 4), the foreign country's firms are labor
intensive in both intra-industry comparisons, so that w* is tied closer to both px and py than is
w. This implies w > iv* if wages rise generally more than prices.
13
 See, for example, the analysis in Jones (1975).
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imposed on the n x n model before many useful comparative statics
properties can be obtained.14
The present paper suggests a route towards a manageable model in higher
dimensions. The neighborhood production structure preserved much of the
ease of analysis characteristic of the standard 2 x 2 model by limiting the
occupational alternatives which any factor of production possesses to
two-employment in the two neighboring industries when a circular ranking
can be devised such as Fig. 1. As in any n x n model the role of factor
intensity comparisons is crucial in linking commodity price changes to the
ranking of factor returns. Although in the neighborhood production
structure no pair of industries shares the same pair of factors (except in the
limiting 2 x 2 version), a multilateral factor intensity ranking can be devised
whereby each factor is intensively used in a different sector, and such a
ranking insures that if the price of the commodity produced in that sector
rises (alone), so will the return to the factor used intensively in that sector.
Our strategy was to utilize this model to analyze the effect on factor
returns of a price rise common to two neighboring productive sectors, while
the rest of the economy remained with prices fixed.15 Such an exercise leads
to a clear categorization of productive factors: the factor used in both
favored sectors is not used anywhere else, a set of n — 3 factors are used
only in the fixed-price part of the economy, while a pair of factors (the
"edge" factors) are used in both subdivisions of the economy. The
distinctions are reminiscent of that made in the specific-factor model
between specific factors and the mobile factor. The potential analogy
between the two models prompted the question: Can the factor price
rankings associated with neighboring price rises in the nx n neighborhood
productive structure approximate those associated with relative price
changes in the specific-factors model? The answer was affirmative if factor
intensity rankings in each subdivision of the economy proved "consistent"
with the multilateral ranking.
The particular application of the neighborhood production structure
considered in this paper allows world trade between two large countries,
each with a national but intersectorally mobile labor force and making use
of a commpn pool of internationally mobile but sector-specific capitals. This
model fits the neighborhood production structure for the 4 x 4 case, when
the world economy is subdivided into two parts, each representing a
particular industry located in both countries. Only if bilateral intra-industry
factor intensity rankings are "consistent" will factor returns resemble the
specific factors model. As was shown, such a "consistent" ranking is
14
 Of course some properties are deducible even in general models. For example the lack of
joint production imposes some restrictions. See Ethier (1974) or Jones and Scheinkman (1977)
for futher discussion. For an alternative form of n x n model, with sufficient structure to
guarantee generalized Stolper-Samuelson results, see Jones and Marjit (1984).
15
 The same techniques could be used for any single subdivision of the economy, regardless
of the number of sectors in the favored part.
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violated if one country employs more capital-intensive techniques than the
other sector-by-sector (in a bilateral value sense).
As these remarks suggest, the neighborhood production structure is rich
in the variety of its outcomes. Factor prices are freed from a direct
dependence on factor endowments (arguably a useful characteristic in
models with international factor mobility), and both specific-factor and
Heckscher-Ohlin type of factor price rankings may be obtained. The choice
between the two rests upon a simple test of consistency of bilateral factor
intensity rankings with the overall multilateral ranking. Further applications
of the model with room for more than four productive activities could be
devised since the neighborhood production structure handles higher dimen-
sions with ease.
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